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HATE’S BODY:  
DANGER AND THE FLESH  
IN DESCARTES’ PASSIONS OF THE SOUL
Hasana Sharp
Recent literature on René Descartes’ Passions of the Soul has sought to erode his reputation as the inventor of the isolated subject, the 
mind severed both from the body and other people. The Passions fleshes 
out the “puzzling I” of the Meditations that so irritated Pierre Gassendi,1 
among others, by elaborating a complex understanding of the embodied 
person, a portrait of the “passionate mind,”2 and a full-blooded take on 
“the Entire Nature of Man,”3 which regards those moved by passions to 
be “capable of enjoying the sweetest pleasures of this life” (PS, a. 212; 
CSM I, 404). Attention to Descartes’ correspondence, as well as to his late 
writings, poses problems for a facile treatment of the Cartesian legacy 
as the source of the solitary and disembodied ego, radically estranged 
from its body, other people, and the natural world. Moreover, his late 
writings suggest an unconscious life of the mind,4 calling into question 
the view of the Cartesian subject as fundamentally self-transparent, 
able to master his body and external nature by way of simple exercises 
of the will. Indeed, there is much to be found in the Passions and the 
correspondence to upset the caricature of Descartes that populates so 
many critiques of modernity.
 Good work in the history of philosophy often challenges our en-
trenched ideas about familiar figures and provokes us to reconsider the 
canned narratives we present to our students and colleagues. Work on 
Descartes faces a particular challenge in this respect, since he is held, 
justly or not, to be responsible for so many contemporary assump-
tions about human existence. Recent commentary has been especially 
concerned to reject the role that Descartes has been seen to play in 
promoting a vision of atomic personhood, in which we are fundamentally 
separate from our bodies and (thus) other people. Attention to his late 
writings reveals a philosopher, in the words of Deborah Brown, “sensi-
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tive to the fact that our embodiment is important to our identities as 
individuals and socially related persons.”5 Similarly, Rebecca Wilkin 
contends that Descartes’ treatise on the passions describes a rela-
tional, “ethical being who perceives him- or herself in varying degrees 
of connection to others.”6 Descartes’ remarks on the passion of love, in 
particular, are cited to challenge the received view of the solitary Car-
tesian subject. Love can inspire a nonegoist ethical stance toward the 
world, even encouraging self-sacrifice in certain circumstances.7 “The 
image of the Cartesian agent as an egoistical individual,” Cecilia Wee 
thus estimates, “receives a serious dent from these accounts of love and 
sacrifice.”8 Thus, a number of scholars exhort us to revise the image of 
the Cartesian person as an asocial, solitary, and isolated ego.
 The main point in favor of revising this portrait of the Cartesian ego 
is his treatment of embodiment and human relationships in his late 
writings. While it is true that, as Descartes remarks about himself, 
he is “not one of those cruel philosophers who want[s] their sage to be 
insensible,”9 I think that from “Descartes embodied”10 we get a more 
conflicted and ambivalent being than these revisionist projects suggest. 
Wilkin contends most boldly that the notion of Descartes as the father 
of individualism is a mistake. She argues that an examination of the 
corporeal foundation of Cartesian moral psychology yields a fundamen-
tally relational subject.11 Even if the passions are, by nature, relational 
phenomena,12 viewing Descartes through the lens of his remarks on 
love and connection is at least partial and one-sided. Relationships of 
connection and affinity are not the only ones that Descartes examines or 
prioritizes in his study of the passions. Indeed, Descartes asserts that, 
as long as we are bound to these mortal coils, “sadness is in some way 
primary and more necessary than joy, and hatred more necessary than 
love; for it is more important to repel [repousser] things which are harm-
ful and potentially destructive than to acquire those things which add 
some perfection which we can subsist without” (PS a. 137; CMS I, 376). 
Although several scholars analyze Descartes’ meditations on love, they 
barely touch on his substantial discussion of hatred. This imbalance is 
remarkable given the primacy of hatred for mortal beings. Attention to 
Descartes’ account of hatred, love’s necessary complement, we will see, 
reveals that it is precisely our embodiment that requires us to assert 
and maintain our power to withdraw from relationships and affirm 
our distinctness. Thus, although Descartes acknowledges the enduring 
effects of our corporeal involvement with others, our embodiment man-
dates that we must both depend on and guard ourselves against others. 
To be embodied, for Descartes, is to be forced to negotiate the fraught 
arena of corporeal communication and contact, without which we would 
not survive but against which we must also protect ourselves. Moreover, 
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the necessity of warding off the noxious effects of other beings issues 
from the body as opposed to the soul. If I must preserve my boundaries 
and cultivate an idiosyncratic sense of what is good for me as a distinct 
being, it is because of the body to which my soul is joined in this life.
 Thus, while I wholeheartedly agree that a more complicated Descartes 
is to be found by way of a close study of the Passions of the Soul as well 
as the correspondence, the nuanced figure who defies caricature is not 
simply an inversion of the received view. It is at least an overstatement 
to find in his moral writings on human relationships a denial of our 
fundamental individuality. Moreover, acknowledgment of the deep am-
bivalence within embodied existence, the dangers and pleasures proper 
to human relationships, may yield a more interesting Descartes than 
one who simply extols the virtues of the human bond. With a complex 
view of “the entire nature of man,” we find a portrait of a creature who is 
fully capable of enjoying embodied life, regarding the passions to be “all 
by nature good” (PS a. 211; CSM, 403–4) and who is defined in no small 
part by the ministrations of caregivers and childhood relationships.13 
Yet, his fuller take on human existence does not preclude a deep wari-
ness of corporeal vulnerability and the threats posed by our relations to 
others. For Descartes, hate is necessary and primary because, as fragile 
beings, we cannot simply allow ourselves to be affected by whatever 
(and whomever) we encounter. Rather, we must protect ourselves from 
those others who poison or demean us. Ignoring this aspect of Descartes’ 
picture of human relationships in the Passions of the Soul may be use-
ful for upsetting the received view of Descartes’ lonely meditator, but 
it may cost us the considerably more ambivalent and complex vision of 
human life that he shares with Princess Elisabeth.
 I begin this paper with a survey of the textual evidence for a new Car-
tesian subject, a post-Cartesian Cartesian individual, for whom the life 
of the body, its passions, and its relationships are central. In the second 
section, I consider his remarks on hatred, which complicate his view of 
embodied life. Even if Descartes’ study of the passions in his treatise 
as well as his correspondence calls for a more nuanced understanding 
of the Cartesian person, we will find in his attention to embodiment a 
conflicted and wary human being for whom relationships can be noxious 
and bitter just as easily as they can be nourishing and sweet.14
loving relations
The turn to a consideration of Descartes’ treatment of love, especially 
by feminist commentators like Wilkin, aims to challenge Susan Bordo’s 
influential presentation of Descartes’ scientific legacy as one of “su-
permasculinization.” For many theorists, the Cartesian subject has 
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become synonymous with the specter of the ego that is radically alien-
ated from its body, world, and fellows. In Bordo’s words, “[T]he separate 
self, conscious of itself and its own distinctness from a world outside 
it, is born in the Cartesian era. This was a psychocultural birth” that 
simultaneously reflected and generated experiences of “inwardness” and 
“separation anxiety,” feelings of being isolated in a hostile world.15 While 
previous cultural critics identified the Cartesian era with interiority and 
a reduction of mind to consciousness,16 Bordo builds on their analyses 
by identifying the specter of solipsism with a distinctively masculine 
stance of “absolute detachment.”17 A project of detachment is masculine, 
for Bordo, not in that it is characteristic of biological males but in the 
Freudian sense that it is normatively appropriate for a masculine subject 
to strive consistently to individuate himself from his original immersion 
in his mother. On such a view, rationality requires that the erotic sub-
ject renounce his bond with his mother and liberate himself to observe 
his body, nature, and other people without the distortions provoked by 
sympathetic affinity and a feeling of unity with the sensuous world.
 Bordo criticizes the Cartesian ambition to individuate one’s mental 
contents from those of other people (“opinion”) and to cleanse them of 
the distortions of the body as a normatively masculine one. In particular, 
Cartesian methodology valorizes the ability to isolate ideas, including 
the idea of the ego, as the condition of possibility for their certainty. 
She does not claim that the Cartesian subject is not psychologically or 
causally constituted by its relations with others but that the scientific 
ideal espoused in the Meditations aspires to overcome or minimize the 
relational and corporeal elements of selfhood in order to grasp what is 
clear and distinct. The idea I have of myself independent of sensation, the 
opinions of others, or metaphysical dogma reveals that “it is certain that 
I am really distinct from my body, and can exist without it” (Meditation 
VI; CSM II, 54). Descartes maintains that we are the kinds of beings 
who can conceive of our minds independently of our bodies and of our 
minds independently of other finite minds. Since we can conceive the 
distinction between our minds and bodies clearly and distinctly, we must 
also confirm that the distinction between them is real and not merely 
conceptual (Principles of Philosophy, pt. I, a. 60; CSM I, 213). When two 
things are really distinct, we do not need the concept of one in order to 
conceive of the other. No notion of extension is needed in order to grasp 
the essence of a thinking substance, and vice versa. The methodology 
of determining the character of reality through a criterion of mental 
clarity is seen to support “epistemic individualism,” understood as a 
scientific perspective that follows from the distinct apprehension of 
the ego, independent of representations of sensuous objects, including 
one’s body and other people. Cartesian analysis authorizes an ideal of 
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cognitive autonomy to be fulfilled by the detached scientific observer.18 
The ideal of the ego able to distinguish itself from its representations 
in order to produce a criterion of certainty informs the received view of 
Cartesianism that comes to define modernity and technological ratio-
nality. To what extent this epistemic individualism entails an ideal of a 
certain kind of personhood (ethical individualism) has become a source 
of contention among scholars.19
 In a compelling article, Rebecca Wilkin challenges the reception of 
Descartes among feminists and critics of modernity as the “inveterate 
dualist and ‘man-midwife’ of individualism.”20 Wilkin thereby joins a host 
of scholars who, like Annette Baier, Deborah Brown, and Amélie Rorty, 
have, without denying Descartes’ egoism and dualism, forced any serious 
student of early modern thought and its legacy to reconsider what these 
doctrines entail. Attention to the Passions of Soul, the correspondence, 
and the sixth meditation reveals that dualism, for example, does not 
mean that the body is invariably an obstacle to knowledge, at least not 
when the kind of knowledge sought concerns the character and virtues 
of a human being. The body’s animal spirits excite passions in the soul 
to which it is intimately joined for the duration of a human life from 
conception to death. Even if such passions are described as “confused 
thoughts,” Descartes is clear that they often contribute to understanding, 
since they inspire the soul to engender and preserve clearer thoughts 
and salutary judgments, while also profoundly enriching human experi-
ence. Descartes, even if he unequivocally avows a “real distinction” of the 
mind and body, clearly values the passions and regards the mind-body 
union to be obvious and known to all by experience.21 With respect to 
the passions, he asserts that the greatest souls undergo more potent 
passions than lesser souls and, moreover, receive the most benefit from 
intense rather than moderate passions.22 While Descartes has almost 
ceaselessly been accused of advocating the transcendence of the body, 
he clearly does not advocate an extirpation of bodily induced passions.
 As Annette Baier points out, moreover, the Cartesian ego is not 
entirely solitary. Descartes posits mental community between a finite 
thinker and an infinite thinker.23 Moreover, she points out that, rather 
than “consistently bypassing the epistemic significance of early experi-
ences with other people,”24 as Lorraine Code charges, Descartes exhibits 
“obscure consciousness” of the developmental and dependent aspects 
of personhood. Indeed, in the Passions of the Soul, such consciousness 
does not even seem so obscure. Descartes presents early childhood and 
even intrauterine experience as important and enduring features of 
human existence without which we would lack the will to survive. It 
is on these grounds that Wilkin goes further than most interpreters in 
her revision of the Cartesian legacy. Like many others, she objects to 
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dualism understood as an antagonism between the mind and body. She 
contests especially the correlated thesis that the mind’s independence 
from the body reflects and reinforces the self ’s independence from 
others, iconically represented by the meditator looking out the window 
questioning whether he sees automata or fellow humans. In contrast to 
the received understanding of the “lone cogitator of the Discours or the 
unmoored mind of the second Meditation,”25 Wilkin finds in Descartes’ 
remarks on intrauterine life a notion of the person marked indelibly by 
an enduring bond with the mother that contours its sense of self and 
relations to others for the entirety of her or his life.
 Indeed, Descartes notes that the first joy felt by the soul occurs when 
it is initially joined to its body and nourished by the mother’s alimen-
tary juices (PS a. 107, a. 109; CSM I, 365–66). This joy immediately 
prompts love, that passion that “impels the soul to join itself willingly 
to objects that appear to be agreeable to it” (PS a. 79; CS I, 356). The 
nourishment the mother’s body provides in the womb moves the soul 
to will its connection to the mother’s body as well as its own. The first 
human experience is of a relationship; that is, of the sensations aroused 
by corporeal communication between the mother and her fetus. More-
over, this experience of oneself in and with another, to allude to G. W. F. 
Hegel,26 is not transient and ephemeral. The soul carries the traces of 
this original love throughout life, such that “the same movement of the 
spirits has ever since accompanied the passion of love” (PS a. 107; CSM 
I, 366).
 Love appears in the Passions of the Soul as one of the six primitive 
passions; it is both ontologically and phenomenologically basic. It is a 
fundamental feature of embodied existence and probably the first experi-
ence the soul undergoes on being united with its body. Descartes notes in 
a letter that prenatal experience certainly includes joy and love, likely 
sadness and hatred as well, the sensations of which always recur with 
those same passions as long as we remain embodied.27 Love involves 
coming to think of ourselves as parts of a whole and persisting in the 
will that we remain bound to this whole (PS a. 83; CSM I, 357). Love is 
thus a passion that connects us to others and invests us in preserving 
this connection as a source of our vitality. Descartes’ portrait of love as 
something that both arouses representations of ourselves as parts of 
wholes and evokes the history of an individual’s attachments attenuates, 
at minimum, the solipsism often attributed to Cartesian consciousness.28
 Before elaborating further, we should note that Descartes defines 
the passions most basically in functional terms. The passions alert the 
soul to the different ways objects “may harm or benefit us, or in general 
be important to us.” They serve to “dispose our soul to will the things 
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which nature deems useful for us, and to persist in this volition” (PS 
a. 52; CSM I, 350). Although the scope of the notion of what is “impor-
tant” is perhaps ambiguous, the primitive passions have special regard 
for the survival and welfare of the embodied individual. The passions 
guide the soul joined to a healthy body to want what is good for it. The 
primacy of wonder suggests that, for Descartes, what is good for the 
embodied individual may not be narrowly circumscribed by corporeal 
needs. A passion like wonder that incites curiosity certainly facilitates 
survival but arguably extends beyond mere bodily endurance to inter-
est in knowing the infinite power that creates and sustains us. Joy and 
love, in particular, alert us to those things in the world that suit us, that 
contribute to our well-being and enhance our existence.
 The fetus’s joy is a confused thought in response to its first sensations, 
interpreted to indicate a “present good” (PS a. 61; CSM I, 351). Love is 
a kind of native intelligence of the fetal soul, by which it assents to be 
joined to the good that is the combination of its mother’s body with its 
own.29 The first passions reveal both what is needed for the soul-body 
union to persevere in being and involve an affirmation, however obscure 
at this point, that the mother’s body is beneficial. Her alimentary juices 
encourage the fetal soul to be joined to its own body and to find in em-
bodied life stimulation, pleasure, and interest. As Descartes remarks 
to Chanut, “[O]ur soul would have no reason to want to remain joined 
to its body for even one minute if it could not feel” passions.30 Love, in 
and ex utero, offers compelling reasons to remain alive, connected to 
our bodies and to other people. The first sensations and thoughts that 
Descartes describes are not of oneself as a discrete, isolated being. The 
first thoughts, although confused by their overwhelmingly corporeal 
character,31 may not yet be discursive, but if we could narrate them, 
they might go something like this: juice is good, I love this “fuel,” this 
connection, this body, and this life. Effectively, the first intrauterine 
representations and volitions enable the soul-body union to persist and 
the human being to survive and develop.
 Love is not, however, confined to an affirmation of what conduces 
to survival in a narrowly biological sense. Intrauterine love prefigures 
and orients future love “by which we consider ourselves henceforth as 
joined with what we love in such a manner that we imagine a whole, of 
which we take ourselves to be only one part, and the thing loved to be 
the another” (PS a. 80; CSM I, 356). Descartes notes that this thought of 
oneself as a part of a whole can take several forms. The passion that a 
miser has for money, an addict for sweet escape, or even a “brutish man 
for a woman he wants to violate” participates in the same love a good 
father has for his children. Each of these figures understands himself to 
form a whole with the beloved object. Yet, Descartes picks out the love of 
 HATE’S BODY 361
Copyright 2011 by the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois
362 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY
the good father as a representation of love in pure form, unmixed with 
the ignoble passions of the drunkard or rapist.32
The love of a good father for his children is so pure that he desires 
nothing from them, and he wants neither to possess them otherwise 
than he does, nor to be joined to them more closely than he already is. 
He regards them, rather, as other parts of himself [considerant comme 
d’autres soy-mesme]. . . . [H]e imagines that he and they together 
form a whole of which he is not the better part, and so he often puts 
their interests before his own and is not afraid of sacrificing himself 
in order to save them. (PS a. 82; CSM I, 357)
In writing to Chanut, Descartes cites Virgil favorably in observing that 
“friendship is not perfect unless each is ready to say in favor of the 
other: ‘It is I who did the deed, I am here, turn your swords against 
me.’”33 Love may entail sacrifice of one’s biological life when one does not 
comprise “the best part of the whole.” Moreover, for Descartes, we ought 
to consider ourselves to be the lesser part of the wholes we form with 
our children, country, or God, and be willing to “embrace with greater 
ardour the interests” of those we love than our own. Descartes warns, 
however, that, just as it would be “preposterous to risk the whole body 
for the preservation of our hair,”34 it would be perverse if one were to 
sacrifice herself for a beloved flower or a horse since they are less noble 
than ourselves (PS a. 83; CSM I, 357).
 In contrast to the image of the paranoid skeptic who gazes on others 
only through a window, Wilkin claims that relationships are essential to 
the Cartesian self that we find in Descartes’ late writings. The Passions 
offers an unexpected paradigm of human life, in which “good fathers who 
love their children were once fetuses who depended on their mother’s 
bodies for nourishment.”35 Moreover, in place of Aristophanes’ erotic story 
devoid of maternal figures, “the fetus’s connection to the mother . . . is 
the originary unity that informs Descartes’ characterization of love.”36 
Descartes can thus be said to acknowledge human dependency and to 
celebrate human association, including love, friendship, and sacrifice on 
behalf of another. Relationships, moreover, are not simply contingent 
and ephemeral features of our lives. Our experience is defined by our 
relations to others in conscious and unconscious ways. In particular, 
Descartes repeatedly remarks on the enduring effects of intrauterine 
life, a relationship that contours one’s thoughts and volitions as long 
as one remains an embodied being. He explains, for example, highly 
idiosyncratic aversions as effects of
having been greatly disturbed [offensez] by some object in the early 
years of their life. Or it may result from their having shared the 
feeling their mother had when she was disturbed by such an object 
Copyright 2011 by the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois
while pregnant; for it is certain that there is a connection between 
all the movements of a mother and those of a child in her womb, so 
that anything adverse to the one is harmful to the other. (PS a. 136; 
CSM I, 376)
The fetus is not simply in the mother as cargo is in a ship. There is a 
connection between all their movements; they form a consummate whole 
and enjoy a full relationship. Sympathetic feeling in the womb not only 
provokes surprising associations and peculiar tastes but disposes one 
to be harmed by what was disagreeable (contraire) to the mother. Des-
cartes’ claim implies at least two things: (1) the effects of an original 
human relationship provoke unconscious associations with objects that 
populate psychic life; and (2) early relationships constitute the disposi-
tion of our bodies in significant and enduring ways. Indeed, in his letters 
to Elisabeth, he explains his own psychic and corporeal afflictions as 
an inheritance from his mother who died not long after his birth. He 
seems to consider his mother’s illness, as well as her death, to be key 
explanatory factors of his physiology and character.37
 Love is said to raise questions about the extent and character of 
Descartes’ individualism because he uses the holistic language of parts 
and wholes. Indeed, his remarks on love have been interpreted to imply 
cosmic holism by at least one serious student of the Passions, while 
others view them as a qualification of his egoism38 or a softening of 
the Vulcan edges of his rationalism.39 Although I see no evidence for 
cosmic holism in Descartes, his thoughts on love are somewhat equivo-
cal on the ontological status of human individuals. On the one hand, 
Descartes typically uses the language of representation, imagination, 
and consideration to describe the lover’s sense of himself as part of a 
whole. Moreover, we know that a hallmark of the Cartseian mind is the 
ability of the will to affirm or deny any representation whatsoever. The 
language of representation, then, implies that being a part of various 
wholes is a self-representation that guides one’s actions but does not 
have the power to determine or constrain them. Thinking in terms of 
parts and wholes might be viewed as an important moral exercise, 
prompted by our physiology, that helps one to determine what goods to 
pursue and, in extreme cases, whether to sacrifice one’s life on behalf 
of one’s “better half.” On this understanding, self-sacrifice is optional 
because one is not ontologically subject to the wholes of which one is 
a part.
 In a letter to Elisabeth responding to her objection that moral practice 
requires an infinite science, Descartes claims that we need only preserve 
in mind the most useful truths to be confident that our judgments are 
good. He completes his list of these four truths with the claim that
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[t]hough each of us is a person distinct from others, whose interests 
are accordingly in some way different from those of the rest of the 
world, we ought still to think that none of us could subsist alone and 
that each one of us is really one of the many parts of the universe, 
and more particularly a part of the earth, the state, the society and 
the family to which we belong by our domicile, our oath of allegiance, 
and our birth. And the interests of the whole, of which each of us is a 
part, must always be preferred to our own particular person.40
Frierson concludes in his reading of this passage that “Descartes does 
not in fact mean to claim that we actually are one of the many parts of 
the universe. Rather, his claim is that we ought to think of ourselves 
that way.”41 As others have argued, the truths that guide action are 
not necessarily those that ground metaphysics or science.42 Descartes 
clearly wants his moral actors to engage in a robust consideration of the 
others on whom we depend, especially God and the state but also our 
children, friends, and, albeit to a lesser extent, our spouses. There are 
certain others whom we ought to regard as “other ourselves” (autres soy-
mesmes), other parts of a whole to which we also belong, and for whom 
we should be willing to forsake our own interests. Pace Earthfirst!, if 
those others are trees or whales, he estimates that we would exhibit 
“disordered mind[s].” Moreover, with respect to those clearly worthy of 
our devotion—like monarchs, children, and friends—Descartes uses 
the idiom of social contract theory to assert that we ought to be willing 
to “transfer” the care we take of ourselves to them.43 The choice of the 
word “transfer” suggests that the care that we would ordinarily give 
to ourselves is originally our own and should be voluntarily given over 
to another but can be withheld. Nothing about the wholes of which we 
are parts, including divinity, constrains our will, forcing us to behave 
one way or another.
 Nevertheless, Descartes’ warnings about the dangers of love indicate 
a fear on his part that relationships are constitutive and insuperable 
elements of selfhood. He urges that, in the presence of potentially 
noxious elements, it is better to hate than to love. In Descartes’ words, 
“there is more danger in being joined to something which is bad, and 
in being as it were transformed into this thing, than there is in being 
separated willingly from a thing which is good.”44 With the qualification 
of the threat of transformation by the phrase “as it were,” Descartes 
signals that the loss of ourselves provoked by loving what is bad for us 
is not a literal ontological mutation but is a metaphorical exaggeration 
of how love affects us. One might see in this warning, however, a bur-
ied acknowledgment that relationships really do make us who we are, 
fundamentally and ineluctably. Perhaps the relation to the mother is a 
salutary constitutive transformation by which we become other than we 
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were. But, for Descartes, even the fetal soul is originally unique, with 
a distinct volitional power that is, at least in principle, separable from 
the representations provoked by sensations.
 Moreover, following our primordial love of maternal juice are invari-
ably sadness and the urge to separate from the other intrinsic to hatred. 
Hatred is an isolating passion by which we separate ourselves from 
others; and, in this life, while the soul is joined to the body, Descartes 
declares that it is more important and less dangerous than love (PS a. 
142; CSM I, 378–79). Below we will find that, even if consummate uni-
fication of the perfect and imperfect thinker is desirable for Descartes, 
hate protects us from dangerous contact.
Hateful isolation
Descartes dedicates more of his analysis to love than to hatred. Although 
he mentions that it belongs to the nature of love to make us chatty 
even when we know very little,45 it is not only due to its being a more 
lubricating topic that commentators have paid much greater attention 
to his treatment of love. The lack of any significant attention to hatred 
and sadness, however, results in a one-sided treatment of Descartes’ 
primitive social passions. Attention to sadness and hatred reveals that 
our embodied nature is precisely what requires the repulsive lever of 
hatred to protect us from harmful others. Just as one bears the imprint 
of fetal love throughout one’s embodied existence, the healthy individual 
preserves a salutary and self-protecting hatred. Whereas love urges us 
to join with others, hate erects a barrier. It is Descartes’ reasonable con-
tention that we need this barrier as long as we are alive. A key feature 
of his dualist perspective is that the body’s interests, as opposed to the 
soul’s, dictate that sadness and hatred are “in some way primary and 
more necessary” than joy and love, “for it is more important to repel 
things which are harmful and potentially destructive than to acquire 
those which add some perfection which we can subsist without” (PS 
a. 137; CSM I, 376). Resonating with Thomas Hobbes, Descartes finds 
that the fragility of the flesh makes hatred a necessary (and primary) 
evil within human relationships. Let us look closer at this salutary but 
costly passion.
 Sadness is first felt, according to Descartes, when we lack nourishment 
(PS a. 110; CSM I, 367), and hatred is often a response to unsuitable 
juice consumed in the womb (PS a. 108; CSM I, 366). He defines hatred 
as the precise antonym to love: “Hatred is an emotion caused by the 
spirits, which impels the soul to want [vouloir] to be separated from 
objects which are presented to it as harmful” (PS a. 79; CSM I, 356).46 
Somewhat ambiguously, Descartes attempts to clarify his assertion 
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about volition in the following article. He notes that he does not mean 
the desire for a future state but the “consent [consentement] by which 
we consider ourselves . . . alone as a whole, entirely separated from the 
thing for which we have an aversion” (PS a. 80; CSM I, 356). Setting 
the obscurities of his doctrine of the will aside, we can observe that ha-
tred involves a shift in perspective from that of love. The arousal of the 
spirits prompts the thought by which one consents to a representation 
of herself as a solitude, a whole unto herself, entirely separate from the 
object of hatred.47
 Hatred, as Byron Williston points out, may be preceded by love. It 
may be especially important to separate ourselves from those things to 
which we once considered ourselves to be intimately joined.48 Hatred is 
an isolating passion that causes us to view ourselves as self-sufficient 
wholes and thereby protects us from those objects to which we may be 
drawn but which also arouse sadness in us. Sadness names “an unpleas-
ant listlessness which affects the soul when it suffers from an evil or 
deficiency which impressions in the brain represent to it as its own” (PS 
a. 92; CSM I, 361). The physiological effects of sadness and hatred are 
similar, each provoking a more or less intense form of dyspepsia. Hatred 
and sadness both prompt the heart to contract in order to constrict the 
influx of harmful juices (PS a. 108, a. 110; CSM I, 366–67). In sadness, 
the stomach continues to metabolize the depressing humors and fluids; 
but, in hatred, the noxious effects are impossible to neutralize. Thus, 
“the stomach ceases to perform its function, being inclined to regurgitate 
and reject the food we have eaten, or at any rate to spoil it and turn it 
into bad humors” (PS a. 98; CSM I, 363) Sadness and hatred protect the 
mind-body union from injurious elements, including those caused by 
traumatic events and negative encounters with fellow humans. Feelings 
of hatred are not just evaluations of the merits of objects or human be-
ings but indications of physiological harm. They alert us to how names 
and images as well as sticks and stones can hurt us.
 Descartes notes that we, as vulnerable, embodied beings, need sad-
ness and hatred, but hatred especially entails disadvantages for the 
scientist. Because hatred separates us from the object hated, it is not 
especially discerning. Hate, thus, does not have as many species as 
love: “we do not notice the difference between evils from which we are 
separated” (PS a. 84; CSM I, 358; translation modified). Things we hate 
look more or less alike: repulsive. Things we love shine forth in their 
variety and richness. In being joined to things, we come to know them 
better. Thus, the passion of love, the physiological stimulation and will 
to be connected to something, can lead to intellectual love. Intellectual 
love is not caused by the body. It is an “interior emotion” provoked by 
the soul itself on judging something that belongs to us to be good (PS a. 
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139; CSM I, 377). Like so many in the history of philosophy, Descartes 
binds love closely to knowledge. Hatred, in estranging us from things 
that might be loved, costs us knowledge. This estrangement, this loss of 
a good we might have possessed, is one reason that hatred and sadness 
so often come together. We cannot but be saddened by the privation that 
alienation entails. In Descartes’ words, “[T]here is nothing real that 
does not have some goodness in it; so the hatred that estranges us from 
some evil estranges us by that very means from the good it is joined to” 
(PS a. 140; CSM I, 377–78). We may be familiar with this loss from the 
experiences of formerly pleasant friendships gone sour. In that case, 
we may intensely mourn the loss of the good that we enjoyed with our 
friend, but hatred maintains the barrier that protects us from the bad 
effects of the relationship.
 Descartes maintains that the soul, in contrast to the body, is invul-
nerable. Evil, for Descartes as for the schoolmen, is only privation and 
nothing real. The soul cannot actually suffer evil. The soul, thus, has 
nothing to lose by joining itself to as many things as possible and know-
ing and loving them without reserve. Intellectual love—love of what is 
known to be truly good—cannot be excessive:
I say also that it cannot be too great, for all that the most excessive 
love can do is join us so perfectly to these goods that the love we have 
especially for ourselves places no distinction between us and them; 
and this, I believe, can never be bad. And it is necessarily followed 
by joy, because it represents to us what we love as a good belonging 
to us. (PS a. 139; CSM I, 377)
The soul admits of infinite expansion. With intellectual love, we do not 
make a distinction between ourselves and what we love. According to 
Alexandre Matheron, Descartes makes love the vehicle by which an 
individual ideally appropriates the good in the universe, especially 
divine power.49 The ambition of the soul is to represent as much reality 
as possible “as a good that belongs to us.”
 The body, however, is finite. It cannot digest all of reality and thereby 
enjoy cosmic oneness with infinite thinking substance. The dyspeptic 
body must protect itself from corrosive forces, even if those threatening 
forces are only the intense agitations of immoderate pleasure. “If we had 
no body,” according to Descartes, “I dare to say that we could not go too 
far in abandoning ourselves to love and joy, or in avoiding hatred and 
sadness. But all of the bodily movements accompanying these passions 
may be injurious to health when they are very violent; on the other hand, 
they may be beneficial to it when they are only moderate” (PS a. 141; 
CSM I, 378; my emphasis). Love and joy must be held in check for the 
sake of our bodily welfare. And hatred and sadness cannot be shunned 
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but must be moderately sustained and given due weight to protect our-
selves from noxious elements. The Bacchanalian revelry in the frenzy 
of truth is counterindicated for the body and, if infinitely enjoyable for 
the soul, must await the loss of its mortal coil.
 It is unsurprising, then, that Descartes counsels his dear friend 
Elisabeth to guard in mind as one of the four most “useful truths” that 
“each of us is a person separate from others and, by consequence, with 
interests that are in some manner distinct from the rest of the world.”50 
The practical importance of our distinctness, I have aimed to show, is 
imposed not by the metaphysical separateness of the individual soul 
but by the needs of our vulnerable bodies. The bodily need for hate and 
sadness belongs both to the inherited and acquired idiosyncrasies of our 
physiology and the generic need of all bodies to undergo passions only in 
moderation. It is our passionate and embodied existence that demands 
our individuation, occasionally our isolation, and the volitional power 
to regard ourselves alone, as a whole, entirely separate from what we 
hate. That is, even if human relationships are important, enriching, and 
informative, we must also regard ourselves as the kinds of beings who 
can and should withdraw ourselves from harmful relationships when 
they provoke too much passionate intensity or otherwise corrupt our 
bodily welfare.
 The notion of an independent and solitary ego fueled especially by 
the second meditation has, as several scholars have shown, overshad-
owed the richer view of human life in Descartes’ philosophy. I agree that 
it is a distortion to find in Descartes a vision of radical atomism that 
flatly denies “the epistemic significance of early experiences with other 
people,” as Lorraine Code contends.51 The Passions of the Soul could 
not have been written had early experiences with other people and the 
loving relation between mother and fetus been deemed insignificant. 
And even if the Passions is not a narrowly epistemological project, it 
must, as a branch of the same tree, be compatible with it. The precise 
problem with the normatively masculine individualism that feminist 
critics, for example, have found in Descartes, or the broader category of 
“Cartesianism,” cannot be seen simply as the denial of dependency and 
loving relationships. Even if an element of “absolute detachment” from 
opinion, sensations, circumstances, and other people remains detectable 
in Descartes’ remedies for dangerous passions (PS a. 211; CS I, 403), it 
is only one of the several useful truths for moral agents. For humans 
considered in terms of their entire nature, relationships are necessary 
and precious, passions are often sweet, and our distinctive interests 
ought, sometimes, to be forsaken for those of the wholes to which we 
belong. Practically, it always remains the case that “one does not know 
how to subsist alone.”52
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 Nevertheless, those who have turned to love to undermine the myth 
of Cartesian solipsism ought to consider the fuller picture. Although it 
is true that, for Descartes, we survive only because we love, he concomi-
tantly and emphatically maintains that we do not persist without the 
armor of hate. The life of the flesh, on Descartes’ account, is not only an 
existence filled with delectable passions, wondrous provocations, and 
nourishing human relations. Being a mind joined to a body entails dan-
gers to which sadness and hatred alert us. Simply put, to be embodied 
is to be dangerously exposed to others, for better and for worse.
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